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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOSE COTERO J. LOPEZ, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 900484-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. 
section 78-2a-3(2)(e) ("interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should this Court abandon the pretext search doctrine? 
2. Was the trial court clearly erroneous in finding that 
Officer Hamner was not credible in claiming that he stopped 
Mr. Lopez for lack of a driver's license and/or lack of a turn 
signal, rather than because Officer Hamner wanted to investigate his 
suspicions that Mr. Lopez was involved in illegal drugs? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The trial court's findings of fact are entitled to 
deference and are to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 and n.5 (Utah 1987). 
Questions of law are to be reviewed by this Court for 
correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions are at issue in 
this case: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Lopez was charged by an Information filed on June 22, 
1990, with one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990) 
(R. 6-7).1 Mr. Lopez waived preliminary hearing, and the magistrate 
1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to 
as "R." The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress, 
(footnote continued) 
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bound the case over to district court (R. 3-4# 10). 
On July 31, 1990, counsel for Mr. Lopez filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence seized during a warrantless search conducted 
by Officer Hamner (R. 19-20). A copy of the motion to suppress is 
contained in Appendix 1 to this brief. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, held August 1, 
1990, defense counsel provided the trial court with a courtesy copy 
of State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (T. 3). The 
prosecutor argued that the trial court should evaluate the case 
under Sierra (T. 4-5). 
The State then called Officer Hamner to testify concerning 
his stop, search, and seizure of Mr. Lopez (T. 6-25). After 
argument on the application of Sierra, the trial court found the 
stop of Mr. Lopez pretextual and ordered the evidence seized by 
Officer Hamner suppressed (T. 28-37). 
A copy of the trial court's findings is in Appendix 2 to 
this brief. 
At a hearing held on August 24, 1990, the State filed an 
objection to the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, which is contained in Appendix 3 to this brief. After hearing 
argument on the State's objection, the trial court maintained the 
ruling suppressing the evidence (T.2 5). A copy of the transcript 
of the hearing on the State's objection is in Appendix 4 to this 
(footnote 1 continued) 
held August 11, 1990, will be referred to as "T." The transcript of 
the hearing on the trial court's findings, held August 24, 1990, 
will be referred to as "T.211. 
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brief. 
The State petitioned for interlocutory review of the trial 
court's ruling, which petition this Court granted on October 31, 
1990 (R. 33). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Officer Hamner was the only witness testifying at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress. His police report was admitted 
into evidence and is provided in Appendix 5. Because the report 
bears on the pretextual nature of the stop of Mr. Lopez, and because 
the report stands in contrast to Officer Hamner's testimony, this 
Court should be familiar with it. It states, in part: 
I observed the A/P driving south of 400 E 
turning east on 700 S w/out signal. I had 
previously observed the veh parked in front of 
the Rose Bar and the Annex Bar, which are known 
to me to be frequented by drug users and dealers. 
I had did a registration check on the plate 
and found the driver was not the owner. I also 
knew the driver who goes by the name, Jose Cruz, 
didn't have a driver license. 
After the A/P made an improper turn, I 
pulled him over at 532 E 700 S. I determined he 
still didn't have a D.L. and he had three 
warrants; 90005358, 900008932, 890033978, all out 
of SLC Curcuit [sic] Court. I arrested the A/P 
for the warrants and no D.L. and making an 
improper turn. 
The discrepancies between the police report and Officer 
Hamner7s testimony are summarized in Table 1, which follows this 
summary of his testimony: 
At 9:00 p.m. on June 19, 1990, Officer Hamner was parked in 
what he referred to as his "hiding place," an alley located just 
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south of 600 South on 400 East (T. 19, 21-22). Officer Hamner said 
he saw the car that Mr. Lopez was driving stopped at the stop light 
on 400 East at about 600 South,2 and immediately recognized the car 
as belonging to Jose Cruz (T. 22, 7-8, 18). When Officer Hamner saw 
Mr. Lopez's face, he thought that Mr. Lopez was Jose Cruz and 
immediately suspected that Mr. Lopez might have had something to do 
with drugs (T. 20, 10). 
Officer Hamner first indicated that the recognition of the 
car stemmed from Officer Hamner7s having seen the car parked in 
front of the Rose and Annex bars (T. 8). He had seen the car parked 
in front of the Rose bar during the week prior to the stop (T. 17). 
He also indicated that he recognized the car because a "couple of 
girls" in the back of the Annex had identified the car as being Jose 
Cruz's car (T. 8). 
Officer Hamner frequented the Rose and Annex bars because 
of the crimes surrounding the bars—the robberies, the fights, and 
the drugs ("they shoot up with needles") (T. 8-9). He had worked as 
an undercover narcotics officer in those two bars prior to the stop 
of Mr. Lopez (T. 20). 
Officer Hamner indicated that he had known Jose Cruz nine 
months prior to the stop on June 19, 1990 (T. 7). He had been shown 
a photo of Mr. Cruz while Officer Hamner was working for the Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force (T. 20). He testified that Mr. Cruz had been 
2. This Court may take judicial notice of the fact that 
there was no stop light, but was a stop sign at this intersection. 
See Utah Rule of Evidence 201 (discussing judicial notice). 
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pointed out and identified as a drug dealer by unspecified people at 
the Rose and Annex bars (T. 22). 
Upon seeing Mr. Lopez, who Officer Hamner thought was Jose 
Cruz, Officer Hamner indicated that he called on his radio to see if 
Jose Cruz was driving without a license, explaining that when 
Officer Hamner had known Jose Cruz nine months previous, Jose Cruz 
had no driver's license (T. 10). Officer Hamner testified that he 
was told by the radio service channel operator that there was no 
record of Jose Cruz having a driver's license (T. 10). 
Officer Hamner testified that he observed Mr. Lopez make a 
turn onto 700 South without signaling, and that Officer Hamner was 
approaching him at that point, pulling him over at 440 East 
700 South (T. 10). The prosecutor established that it is against 
the law to drive without signaling, that Officer Hamner issues about 
seven citations for that offense per month (T. 11). 
Officer Hamner then clarified that Officer Hamner had 
decided to stop Mr. Lopez because there was no license recorded for 
Jose Cruz, before the turn without signal (T. 19). He indicated 
that it is his practice to stop drivers without licenses unless he 
is pursuing a high priority call (T. 11). 
After Officer Hamner stopped Mr. Lopez, Officer Hamner 
checked the license plates, determining that the car was registered 
to some unidentified person living with Pedro Lopez (T. 11-12). 
Officer Hamner indicated that after Mr. Lopez gave him his 
identification, Officer Hamner checked and learned that there were 
three warrants outstanding for Mr. Lopez (T. 12). Mr. Lopez was 
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then placed under arrest (T. 13). Officer Hamner indicated that 
Mr. Lopez was first arrested for the warrants, and that Officer 
Hamner cited Mr. Lopez for the improper turn and lack of driver's 
license when Officer Hamner booked him into jail (T. 13). 
Officer Hamner conducted an impound/inventory search, 
during which he discovered a a bag of cocaine under a cushion of the 
driver's seat (T. 14). 
TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN 
OFFICER HAMNER'S POLICE REPORT AND TESTIMONY 
Report 
Hamner makes no report 
of calling to check 
Cruz's license 
Hamner reports calling to check 
Lopez's license after 
improper turn and stop 
Hamner reports 
registration check 
before stopping Lopez 
Hamner refers to Lopez 
as Gerardo Jose Lopez 
and Jose Lopez Cruz 
Testimony 
Hamner called to check 
Cruz's license before 
stop for no license 
Hamner called to check 
Lopez's license after stop 
and discovery that Lopez 
is not Cruz 
Hamner checked registration 
after stopping Lopez 
Hamner refers to Lopez 
as Jose Cruz 
and Geraldo Lopez 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should not adopt the State's position that the 
pretext doctrine discussed in Sierra should be abandoned. This 
argument presented by the State on appeal is directly contradictory 
to the State's argument to the trial court. This argument was not 
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presented in the petition for interlocutory appeal. 
Further, the standard presented by the State is 
inconsistent with Utah and federal constitutional law protecting 
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's finding that 
Officer Hamner was acting pretextually in stopping Mr. Lopez. The 
trial court's ruling that Officer Hamner's stop of Mr. Lopez was 
pretextual turns on Officer Hamner's lack of credibility in claiming 
that he stopped Mr. Lopez for driving without a license, rather than 
to investigate his suspicion that Mr. Lopez was involved in drugs. 
This Court should defer to the trial court's assessment of the 
evidence presented through Officer Hamner because the trial court 
was in the best position to assess the evidence. 
The trial court's findings are factually accurate. In the 
event that this Court requires additional findings, the Court should 
direct the trial court to find (1) whether Officer Hamner's 
testimony concerning the improper turn and his belief that Mr. Lopez 
was Jose Cruz was credible, and (2) whether a reasonable 
hypothetical officer would have stopped Mr. Lopez absent Officer 
Hamner's pretextual motivation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD RETAIN THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE. 
A. THE STATE IS NOT IN THE PROPER PROCEDURAL POSTURE TO ATTACK THE 
PRETEXT DOCTRINE. 
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The State argues that this Court should abandon the pretext 
doctrine. Brief of Appellant 11 through 15. 
As a procedural matter, this Court need not address this 
argument because it is directly contradictory to the position the 
State asserted before the trial court. The trial prosecutor argued 
that the case should be analyzed as a pretext case under State v. 
Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (T. 4-5). The trial 
prosecutor analyzed the case as a pretext case under Sierra 
(T. 25-28). The trial prosecutor specifically concurred with the 
essence of the pretext doctrine, stating, 
And I suppose this is the idea is if you get 
behind anybody long enough you'll find some 
violation, some technical violation. And the 
State certainly doesn't have any qualms with 
that. The fact that you have a suspicion that 
somebody's a drug dealer, you can't just follow 
him around town waiting for them to make some 
minor violation of the law. 
(T. 27). 
Well established precedent provides that this Court need 
not countenance the State's contradictory argument on appeal. See 
e.g. State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-159 (Utah) (appellate court 
need not review issue, even for plain error, if issue was actively 
waived by party in trial court), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
Of greater procedural importance is the fact that the State 
has never obtained permission to raise this issue concerning the 
merits of the pretext doctrine in this interlocutory appeal. The 
issues raised in the State's petition for interlocutory appeal are 
as follows: 
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1. Do the trial court's findings of fact 
meet the requirement of detailed findings of fact 
set forth in State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 
n.l (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 78 (Utah 1990)? 
2. Is the trial court's finding that 
"[t]here was no testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever 
represented himself to Officer Hamner as being 
named or going by the name of Jose Cruz" clearly 
erroneous? 
3. Is the trial court's legal conclusion 
that Officer Hamner's stop of defendant was a 
pretext stop correct under the pertinent 
decisions of this Court? 
(R. 37). Compare Brief of Appellant at 2 (Issue 4. "Should this 
Court retain the pretext stop analysis adopted in State v. Sierra, 
754 P.2d 972, 977-79 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), disavowed on other 
grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)?). 
Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 5, because the State 
did not raise the issue concerning the merits of the pretext 
doctrine in the petition for interlocutory appeal, the State has 
neither invoked nor obtained this Court's discretionary jurisdiction 
over that issue. This Court should discourage this abuse of the 
appellate process by striking issue 4 from the State's brief, as the 
Court is empowered to do by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(k). 
B. IF THIS COURJ? ADDRESSES THE ISSUE, THIS COURT SHOULD VITALIZE 
THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE. 
1. What is the pretext doctrine? 
The term "pretext" is defined by the court in State v. 
Holmes, 256 So.2d 32 (Fla. App. Dist. 2 1972), as 
"A purpose or motive alleged, or an appearance 
assumed, in order to cloak the real intention or 
state of affairs; excuse; pretense; cover; 
semblance." 
- 10 -
Id. at 34 n.8, quoting Webster's New International Dictionary of the 
English Language, 2d ed. 1957. 
Numerous courts have defined the pretext doctrine in search 
and seizure cases. See e.g. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 
1515 (10th Cir. 1988) ("A pretextual stop occurs when the police use 
a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person 
or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious crime 
for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to 
support a stop.11); United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th 
Cir. 1989) ("By definition, a pretextual arrest occurs when the 
police employ an arrest based on probable cause as a device to 
investigate or search for evidence of an unrelated offense for which 
probable cause is lacking.11); People v. Hollowav, 330 N.W.2d 405, 
412 (Mich. 1982) ("'Pretext arrests' are arrests in which the 
officer, although making an apparently lawful arrest, is making the 
arrest to conduct a search for which there is no independent 
probable cause. The basic principle is simply that '[a]n arrest may 
not be used as a pretext to search for evidence," United States v. 
Lefkowitz. 285 U.S. 452, 467, 52 S.Ct. 420, 424, 76 L.Ed.2d 877 
(1932) .) . 
Pretextual police practices result from the development and 
abuse of various exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant 
requirement. An example of how pretextual police practices 
retrogress from exceptions to the warrant requirement is shown in 
United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), where the 
court explained, 
- 11 -
In the present case, the possibility that the 
police used the traffic arrest as a pretext to 
search for evidence of narcotics arises due to 
the confluence of three factors. The first 
factor is the recognition of a search incident to 
arrest exception to the warrant requirement. See 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 
2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Under this 
exception, a police officer may thoroughly search 
the person of a suspect after making a custodial 
arrest. The second factor is the extension of 
this exception to all custodial arrests including 
those involving traffic offenses. See United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 
38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). 
The final factor is the presence of the so-called 
"serendipity" doctrine which deems all evidence 
discovered during a lawful search to be 
admissible in later proceedings. See Harris v. 
United States. 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 
L.Ed. 1399 (1947). See also LaFave, Case by Case 
Adjudication or Standarized fsicl Procedures The 
Robinson Dilemma, 15 S.Ct. Rev. 127, 156 (1974). 
The search incident exception itself is a 
narrowly tailored doctrine designed to protect 
police officers from danger and prevent the 
destruction of evidence. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 
768, 89 S.Ct. at 2042. The potential benefits to 
be derived from a search of the person, however, 
provide the police with the incentive to employ 
the exception as a potent investigatory tool. 
Id. at 1039. 
2. Why is the pretext doctrine important? 
As this Court recognized in State v. Sierra, the pretext 
doctrine reflects the judicial responsibility to safeguard 
constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
and to prevent legal processes from being used as devices to defeat 
constitutional rights. The Sierra court explained, 
[I]t is impermissible for law enforcement 
officers to use a misdemeanor arrest as a pretext 
to search for evidence of a more serious crime. 
- 12 -
The violation of a constitutional right 
by a subterfuge cannot be justified.... 
Were the use of misdemeanor arrest 
warrants as a pretext for searching 
people suspected of felonies to be 
permitted, a mockery could be made of 
the Fourth Amendment and its 
guarantees. The courts must be 
vigilant to detect and prevent such a 
misuse of legal processes. 
754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah App. 1988), quoting Taalavore v. United 
States, 291 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1961). 
In addition to requiring honesty of police officers, the 
pretext doctrine requires prosecutors and courts to focus on 
realities, rather than pretenses, thus protecting the integrity of 
prosecutors and courts. See United States v. Keller. 499 F.Supp. 
415, 418 (N.D. 111., E.D. 1980) ("[S]ince the Supreme Court has 
continually emphasized that the primary purpose of the exclusionary 
rule is deterrence, suppression of evidence derived from deliberate 
misconduct is particularly appropriate. In a concurring opinion, 
Justices Powell and Rehnquist noted the pretextual arrest as an 
example where 7the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule is most 
likely to be effective, and the corresponding mandate to preserve 
judicial integrity ... most clearly demands the fruits of official 
misconduct be denied.7 Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 611, 95 
S.Ct. 2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)."). Cf. State v. Arrovo. 
796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990) (one purpose of the federal 
exclusionary rule is to "prevent making a court a 'party to lawless 
invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting 
unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.7") 
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(quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). 
In Sierra, this Court recognized the all-pervasive impact 
portending from pretextual police behavior: 
"'[I]n most jurisdictions and for most traffic 
offenses the determination of whether to issue a 
citation or effect a full arrest is discretionary 
with the officer,' and ... 'very few drivers can 
traverse any appreciable distance without 
violating some traffic regulation,' this 
[pretextual traffic stop] is indeed a frightening 
possibility. It is apparent that virtually 
everyone who ventures out onto the public streets 
and highways may then, with little effort by the 
police, be placed in a position where he is 
subject to a full search. Nor is one put at ease 
by what evidence exists as to police practices in 
this regard; it is clear that this subterfuge is 
employed as a means for searching for evidence on 
the persons of suspects who could not be lawfully 
arrested for the crimes of which they are 
suspected." 
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 978-979, quoting LaFave, Search and Seizure, 
§ 5.2(e) (2d ed. 1987) (footnotes omitted). 
In State v. Holmes. 256 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1972), the court 
explained that the pretext doctrine is also meant to protect equal 
protection principles in law enforcement: 
We conclude that at the bottom of the 
pretextual arrest doctrine is an unarticulated 
application of Yick Wo v. Hopkins [118 U.S. 356 
(1886)]: "Though the law itself be fair on its 
face, and impartial in appliance, yet, if it is 
applied and administered by public authority with 
an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as 
practically to make unjust and illegal 
discriminations between persons in similar 
circumstances, material to their rights, the 
denial of equal justice is still within the 
prohibition of the constitution." This 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
suggests that the real evil of searches and 
seizures incident to a traffic arrest is not that 
the arrest is a pretext for the search, but that 
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the arrest is one which would not have been made 
but for the motive of the arresting officer. 
Holmes, 256 So.2d at 34, quoting Yick Wo at 373-374. See also 
United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[I]n 
the absence of standardized police procedures that limit discretion, 
whether we are simply allowed to continue on our way with a stern 
look, or instead are stopped and subjected to lengthy and intrusive 
interrogation when we forget to wear our seat belts, turns on no 
more than 'the state of the digestion of any officer who stops us 
or, more likely, upon our obsequiousness, the price of our 
automobiles, the formality of our dress, the shortness of our hair 
or the color of our skin.' [Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment. 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349, 416 (1974)]."). 
3. This Court should not abandon the pretext doctrine. 
The State presents two reasons why this Court should 
abandon the pretext doctrine: (1) the pretext doctrine is difficult 
to apply, Brief of Appellant at 12-13; and (2) some federal courts 
in some federal decisions have rejected the pretext doctrine, Brief 
of Appellant at 14-15. 
The two goals of the State, easy application of the law, 
and mimicry of federal precedent, do not begin to compare in 
significance with the goals served by the pretext search doctrine— 
integrity in law enforcement and protection of constitutional rights 
against unreasonable search and seizure. See Article I section 27 
of the Utah Constitution ("Frequent recurrence to fundamental 
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principles is essential to security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government."). 
As is discussed below, the confusion the State perceives in 
the pretext doctrine can be traced to federal precedent. The answer 
to this confusion is not to lop off judicial powers for maintaining 
evenhanded, honest law enforcement and constitutional rights against 
unreasonable search and seizure. Rather than following the 
haphazard federal precedents, this Court should clarify the pretext 
doctrine under the Utah Constitution. 
a. Understanding federal precedent 
i. The subjective intent of police officers is relevant. 
The State complains that Sierra is difficult to apply 
because, despite this Court's emphasis that the focus in pretext 
cases must be objective, courts analyzing pretext cases frequently 
refer to evidence of the police officers' subjective intent. Brief 
of Appellant at 13. 
In State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this 
Court explicitly stated that the subjective intent of the officer is 
irrelevant, and repeatedly emphasized that the inquiry under the 
fourth amendment must be objective. Id. at 977-979 and n.3. This 
Court's objective assessment rule is an accurate quotation of 
Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128 (1978), 
"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and 
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not on the officer's actual state of mind at the 
time the challenged action was taken." 
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463f 105 S.Ct. 2778, 
2783, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (quoting Scott v. 
United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). 
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977. 
As the court explained in United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 
1512 (10th Cir. 1988), police officers can readily adapt their 
testimony to reflect the state of mind necessary to justify the 
scope of their actions, and thus, their conclusory testimony on 
their subjective intent may be of negligible value. Id. at 1516. 
See also State v. Lovearen. 798 P.2d 767, 771 n.10 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) ("While the individual officer's own practice may well be 
probative of what the hypothetical reasonable officer would do under 
the circumstances, his characterization of his intent at the time is 
essentially irrelevant."); United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 710 
(11th Cir. 1986) ("[W]hile Trooper Vogel#s courtroom declaration of 
motive is intriguing, what turns this case is the overwhelming 
objective evidence that Vogel had no interest in investigating 
possible drunk driving charges."). 
As the Guzman court explained, misapplication of the 
objective test in pretext cases hinders the goal of limiting 
excessive police discretion: 
It is the need to restrain the arbitrary exercise 
of discretionary police power that has been the 
driving force behind the Court's decisions 
forbidding police practices not amenable to 
objective review. Brown v. Texasr 443 U.S. 47, 
52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) 
("When ... a stop is not based on objective 
criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive 
police practices exceeds tolerable limits."); 
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Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S.Ct. 
1391, 1400, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) 
("[S]tandardless and unconstrained discretion is 
the evil the Court has discerned when in previous 
cases it has insisted that the discretion of the 
official in the field be circumscribed"). 
Determining the constitutionality of intrusions 
by the prosecution's ability to justify them 
under some set of objective circumstances would 
undermine the Court's concern with limiting 
unreviewable discretion in the name of the 
objective test designed to safeguard that concern. 
Id. at 1516. See also United States v. Keller. 499 F.Supp. 415, 417 
(N.D. 111. 1980) ("If every arrest were judged by an objective 
standard and upheld if there was a valid basis for arrest, then 
there could never be a pretextual arrest. The concept assumes that 
there is a basis for an arrest, but that the arrest is made for the 
purpose of conducting a search for which there would not otherwise 
be a justification. Although proving subjective motives is 
unquestionably problematic, to judge an arrest by an objective 
standard ignores, instead of solves, the problem.") (citation 
omitted). 
The Sierra court's statement that the inquiry in pretext 
cases is to focus on whether a hypothetical reaso \able officer would 
have made the stop, rather than could have made the stop, 754 P.2d 
at 978, is consistent with the correct line of cases which requires 
justification of the stop within the actual objective facts of the 
case, and does not permit justification of the stop with 
explanations crafted by prosecutors after the fact. See also United 
States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986) (police officer 
testified that his purpose in stopping Mr. Smith's car was to 
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investigate drug activity; when state argued on appeal that the stop 
could be justified as a traffic stop, the court explained that the 
fact that the officer theoretically could have made the traffic stop 
was not at issue, but that the focus was properly on whether a 
reasonable hypothetical officer would have made the stop absent the 
pretextual motivation held by the actual officer). 
It is important to note that under the lead federal case 
relied on in Sierra and frequently cited as the source of an 
objective assessment standard in pretext cases, Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978), the subjective intent of the officer is 
pertinent to evaluating the police officer's credibility, and in 
determining whether exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy. 
The Scott Court stated, 
This is not to say, of course, that the 
question of motive plays absolutely no part in 
the suppression inquiry. On occasion, the motive 
with which the officer conducts an illegal search 
may have some relevance in determining the 
propriety of applying the exclusionary rule. For 
example, in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 
458, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 96 S.Ct. 3021 (1976), we 
ruled that evidence unconstitutionally seized by 
state police could be introduced in federal civil 
tax proceedings because "the imposition of the 
exclusionary rule . . . is unlikely to provide 
significant, much less substantial, additional 
deterrence. It falls outside the offending 
officer/s zone of primary interest." See also 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 
276-277, 55 L.Ed.2d 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054 (1978). 
This focus on intent, however, becomes relevant 
only after it has been determined that the 
Constitution was in fact violated. We also have 
little doubt that as a practical matter the 
judge's assessment of the motives of the officers 
may occasionally influence his judgment regarding 
the credibility of the officers' claims with 
respect to what information was or was not 
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available to them at the time of the incident in 
question. But the assessment and use of motive 
in this limited manner is irrelevant to our 
analysis of the questions at issue in this case. 
436 U.S. 128, 139 n.13. 
Several cases following Scott, including those relied on by 
the State, recognize that the subjective intent of police officers 
is a relevant factor to be considered in pretext cases. E.g. United 
States v. Cummins. 920 F.2d 498, 501 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Causev. 834 F.2d 1179, 1182 n.7 (5th Cir. 1987). 
ii. The hypothetical reasonable officer test is helpful in 
analyzing pretext cases. 
The State complains that the hypothetical reasonable 
officer test is difficult to apply. Appellant's brief at 13-14. 
The hypothetical reasonable officer test is a necessary 
limitation on the pretext doctrine, which can be appreciated after 
review of the discussion provided in State v. Holmes, 256 So.2d 32 
(Fla. 1972): 
If we suppose an unsuspected person arrested 
for a traffic violation of such gravity that any 
citizen would be stopped for it, can we deny that 
contraband in plain view of the officer may 
lawfully be seized? Suppose, on the other hand, 
an equally grave violation by a person suspected 
of more serious crime. Is he immune from lawful 
arrest? Certainly he should not be. Is he then 
immune from lawful seizure of the evidence of the 
serious crime if it is then in plain view? We 
think not, provided that the gravity of the 
traffic offense is such that any citizen would 
routinely be stopped for it if seen committing 
the offense by a traffic officer on routine 
patrol. ... 
[T]he real evil of searches and seizures incident 
to a traffic arrest is not that the arrest is a 
- 20 -
pretext for the search, but that the arrest is 
one which would not have been made but for the 
motive of the arresting officer. 
Id, at 34. See also United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 710 (11th 
Cir. 1986) ("The stop was unreasonable not because the officer 
secretly hoped to find evidence of a greater offense, but because it 
was clear that an officer would have been uninterested in pursuing 
the lesser offense absent that hope."). 
The State contends that in Sierra, this Court did not apply 
the hypothetical reasonable officer test, but simply applied the 
Delaware v. Prouse test to determine whether the traffic offense 
asserted by the officer in Sierra had been committed. Appellant's 
brief at 13. This argument overlooks this Court's repeated 
conclusion that a reasonable officer would not have stopped 
Mr. Sierra for the traffic violation asserted by the actual officer 
who stopped Mr. Sierra. 754 P.2d at 979. The Sierra court's 
conclusion that a hypothetical officer would not have made the stop 
of Mr. Sierra for the traffic violation that did not occur does not 
translate the case into a simple traffic violation case. See also 
State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 n.3 (Utah 1990) (finding that 
asserted traffic violation did not occur was merely one factor 
supporting conclusion that reasonable hypothetical officer would not 
have made the pretextual stop). 
The facts that Mr. Sierra and Mr. Arroyo did not violate 
the traffic code are of paultry judicial significance in comparison 
to the facts that Troopers Smith and Mangelson were fabricating 
traffic violations in order to violate constitutional rights against 
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unreasonable search and seizure (and may have been acting in 
violation of equal protection principles, as well). 
Particularly in cases where technical traffic violations in 
fact occur and the Prouse test is satisfied, this Court needs to 
maintain the pretext doctrine to insure that technical traffic 
violations are not used as devices to evade the warrant requirement. 
The State complains that case law is unclear on who bears 
the burden of proof in pretext cases and what kind of evidence is to 
be presented as support for the hypothetical reasonable officer 
argument. Brief of Appellant at 13. 
In State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), the court 
established that the State bears the burden of proving that 
warrantless searches can be justified: 
Searches conducted "outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 
(1967) (citations omitted); State v. Harris, 671 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1983). The burden of establishing 
the existence of one of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement is on the prosecution. 
Harris. 671 P.2d at 178. 
Arroyo at 687. "An otherwise valid search of an automobile will 
violate the fourth amendment if the grounds for the underlying stop 
or arrest are merely a pretext for the search itself." United 
States v. Lewis, 910 F.2d 1367, 1371 (7th Cir. 1990). 
Counsel for Mr. Lopez has been able to find only one 
jurisdiction specifically setting forth the burden of proof in 
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pretext cases. In Florida, the state bears the burden of showing 
that "under the facts and circumstances a reasonable officer would 
have stopped the vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose." 
Kehoe v. State. 521 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1988). Accord Porcher v. 
State. 538 So.2d 1279, 1279 (Fla. App. 1989). This allocation of 
the burden of proof is justified by reference to City of Xenia v. 
Wallace. 524 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1988). While Wallace is not a pretext 
case, it exemplifies and explains how and why burdens are to be 
allocated in search and seizure cases. 
In Wallace, the court held that "once a defendant has 
demonstrated a warrantless search or seizure and adequately 
clarified that the ground upon which he challenges its legality is 
lack of probable cause, the prosecutor bears the burden of proof, 
including the burden of going forward with the. evidence, on the 
issue of whether probable cause existed for the search or seizure." 
Id. at 893. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed 
the reasons that the burden might be placed on the state: 
(1) a party charged from the outset with the 
burden of persuasion with respect to a particular 
issue ordinarily has the subsidiary burden of 
going forward with evidence regarding such issue; 
(2) the state has primary access to persons with 
the relevant information (i.e.. the law 
enforcement officers); and (3) it is less 
burdensome for a party to produce evidence on the 
existence of probable cause than the lack of 
probable cause. 
Id. at 893 (citations omitted, emphasis by the court). The court 
then discussed the reasons why the burden might be placed on the 
defendant: 
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(1) the presumption of regularity of the actions 
of law enforcement officials; (2) the usual 
requirement that the moving party go forward with 
evidence in support of his motion; and (3) the 
need for the prosecutor and the court to be put 
on notice as to what the defendant is challenging. 
Id. 
The court concluded that the burden should be placed on the 
state because warrantless searches are not entitled to a presumption 
of regularity, but are per se unreasonable. In order to account for 
the other two reasons normally justifying placement of the burden of 
the defendant, the court set forth the requirements that the 
defendant first establish the warrantless search, and then give the 
state notice of the specific ground for challenging the warrantless 
search. Id. 
Applying the Wallace rationale to the pretext context, 
there are at least three reasons why the State should bear the 
burden of showing that "under the facts and circumstances a 
reasonable officer would have stopped the vehicle absent an 
additional invalid purpose," Kehoe v. State, 521 So.2d 1094, 1097 
(Fla. 1988). First, the State has the burden of persuasion in 
justifying the warrantless search. See Arroyo. supra. Second, the 
State has primary access to the police officers who conduct the 
searches. Third, it is easier for the State to show that a stop and 
search would have been made regardless of an officer's improper 
purpose that it would be for a defendant to show the negative of 
that proposition. Once a defendant files a proper motion to 
suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search, alleging with 
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sufficient specificity the ground of pretextual police conduct, the 
State is in the best position to go forward with relevant evidence 
on the hypothetical officer test. 
Trie State criticizes the "usual police practices" approach, 
which the State characterizes as "inherent in the Sierra pretext 
analysis." Brief of Appellant at 15. While evidence of usual 
police practices may be helpful in applying the hypothetical 
reasonable officer test, see Lovearen. 798 P.2d at 771 n.10, relying 
on United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1988), it 
is neither dispositive of the test nor necessary to it in every 
case. For examples, in Sierra and Arroyo. evidence of usual police 
practices concerning the traffic violations alleged by Troopers 
Smith and Mangelson was not essential in applying the reasonable 
hypothetical officer test because the courts found that the traffic 
violations alleged by the troopers did not occur. This case may be 
another case in which evidence of usual police practices would not 
be helpful; given the discrepancies between Officer Hamner's 
testimony and police report, it may be that the court will not need 
evidence to support the conclusion that a reasonable hypothetical 
officer would not make a stop for traffic violations that did not 
occur. 
Additionally, it should be noted that usual police 
practices are not dispositive of the hypothetical reasonable officer 
test, because an officer may deviate from usual police practices in 
appropriate circumstances and because usual police practices may be 
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unconstitutional. Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 
70, 110 (1982). 
b. Clarifying under the Utah Constitution 
Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), the main 
opinion for the first time departed from federal interpretations of 
the fourth amendment to the Federal Constitution in creating 
independent state law under Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution.3 The basis for the court's action was the need to 
clarify an area of search and seizure law that had grown confusing 
and unworkable in the federal courts. Id. at 469. 
As the State's brief in this case demonstrates, federal 
precedent on the pretext doctrine is confusing. 
In the event that this Court chooses to overlook the 
State's waiver of the issue concerning the merits of the pretext 
doctrine, this Court should clarify the pretext doctrine under 
Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
3. Larocco is a plurality opinion written by Justice 
Durham. Justice Zimmerman concurred in Justice Durham's opinion. 
Justice Stewart concurred in the result of Justice Durham's 
opinion. Justice Howe, joined by Chief Justice Hall, dissented, 
resulted in splits of authority and confusion. 
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Additionally, this Court may choose to rely on Article I 
section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees uniform 
operation of laws. See Larocco at 465 (discussing uniform operation 
of laws under Utah Constitution). Reliance on this provision would 
be appropriate because, in curtailing opportunities for pretextual 
police conduct, this Court curtails opportunities for discriminatory 
law enforcement. See State v. Holmes, 256 So.2d 32, 34 (Fla. 1972) 
(discussing how police may use pretextual behavior to facilitate 
discriminatory law enforcement); United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 
1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1988) (same). 
The fundamental source of confusion in the federal pretext 
doctrine cases is the role of evidence of the police officer's 
subjective intent. As noted by the Sierra Court, the opinion in 
Scott v. United States. 436 U.S. 128 (1978), calls for an objective 
assessment of police conduct: 
"Whether a Fourth Amendment violation has 
occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of the 
officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting him at the time,' and 
not on the officer's actual state of mind at the 
time the challenged action was taken," 
Maryland v. Macon. 472 U.S. 463, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 
2783, 86 L.Ed. 2d 370 (1985) (quoting Scott v. 
United States. 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978)). 
Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977.4 
4. It is arguable that the objectivity rule in Scott is 
dicta, see Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never 
Leaving," 66 U. Detroit L.Rev. 363, 366-368 (1989); Burkoff, "Bad 
Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 83-84 (1982); Burkoff, "The 
Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 
U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523 (1984); and that the legal underpinnings of that 
dicta are wanting, see LaFave, Search and Seizure, section 1.4, 
(footnote continued) 
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However, in federal cases prior to and subsequent to Scott, 
the United States Supreme Court has evaluated the subjective intent 
of the officer in determining whether a fourth amendment violation 
has occurred.5 
But in other cases, the Court has repeated the Scott 
objective test relied on by the court in Sierra.6 
As noted in the case relied on by the State in this appeal, 
United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989), application 
of an objective test which ignores an officer's subjective intent 
effectively shields pretextual police conduct from judicial scrutiny 
and kills the pretext doctrine. Id. at 1040, citing United 
States v. Keller, 499 F.Supp. 415, 417 (N.D.Ill. 1980) (Crowley, J.). 
This Court should act under the Utah Constitution and 
(footnote 4 continued) 
pages 81-83; A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 (1983); 
Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982). 
5. See e.g. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500 
(1958); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226, 230 (1960); Ker v. 
California, 374 U.S. 23, 42-43 (1963); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364, 376 (1976); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 
(1980) (per curiam); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 
(1981); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (plurality 
opinion); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1987); 
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85, 87 (1987); O'Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 729 (1987) (plurality opinion). See also 
Burkoff Article, at 366-367, 394-408 (1989); Burkoff, "Bad Faith 
Searches," 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70, 75-83 (1982); Burkoff, "The Pretext 
Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 
523, 544-548 (1984); A. Eisemann Note, 63 B.U.L.Rev. 223, 242-244 
(1983). 
6. See e.g. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 
579, 584 n.3 (1983); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 471 (1985). 
See also Burkoff, "The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now 
You Don't," 17 U.Mich.J.L.Ref. 523, 524-525, 528-532 (1984). 
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vitalize the pretext doctrine by recognizing that the subjective 
intent of the officer is relevant, and may be proved by traditional 
objective evidence or by the officer's direct testimony on his 
subjective intent. Such an approach would be consistent with 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), wherein the court 
explicitly held that under the Utah Constitution, "exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I section 14." Id. at 472 (emphasis added). 
As noted previously, under the federal fourth amendment 
Scott decision, the subjective intent of the officer is not entirely 
irrelevant, but is pertinent to determining whether exclusion of 
evidence is an appropriate remedy. United States v. Scott. 436 U.S. 
128, 139 n.13. Because exclusion of evidence is a necessary 
consequence of an Article I section 14 violation under Larocco, the 
Scott rule, limiting the relevance of the officer's subjective 
intent to the exclusion question, does not apply. 
This Court may wish to make a more thorough clarification 
of search and seizure law, by requiring under Article I section 14 
"that a warrant must be obtained before any nonconsensual search of 
property not in the immediate physical control of a suspect is 
conducted." State v. Hvcrh. 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring). By limiting the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement in this way, this Court could protect individual 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures from unbridled 
police discretion, and could also set forth clear and workable 
guidelines for police to follow. Id. If this Court clarified the 
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law of search and seizure in this manner under the Utah 
Constitution, police would have fewer exceptions to the warrant 
requirement to abuse, and there would be fewer pretext cases. See 
United States v. Trigg. 878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(explaining how pretextual police conduct results from development 
and abuse of exceptions to warrant requirement). 
In sum, the pretext doctrine is critical to individual 
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and to fair and 
honest law enforcement. This Court should reject the State's 
suggestion to abandon the pretext doctrine. In the event that this 
Court chooses to clarify this area of search and seizure law, this 
Court should do so in a manner that promotes the pretext doctrine 
and the rights the doctrine is designed to protect. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING ON OFFICER HAMNER'S LACK OF CREDIBILITY. 
The essence of the trial court's ruling suppressing the 
evidence seized in the warrantless search is that Officer Hamner was 
not credible. This is so despite the facts that the trial court 
complimented the officer on his candor (presumably because the 
officer admitted that he suspected Mr. Lopez of drug involvement 
before stopping him (T. 35)), and explicitly refrained from "casting 
aspersions" on the officer's integrity (T. 36). At bottom, the 
trial court's ruling and written findings reflect the trial court's 
rejection of Officer Hamner's testimony that he stopped Mr. Lopez 
for driving without a license (T. 19) and did not stop Mr. Lopez 
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because he wanted to investigate his suspicion that Mr. Lopez was 
involved in illegal drugs (T. 20). See Appendix 2. 
The trial court's factual assessment of Officer Hamner's 
testimony is entitled to the deferential "clearly erroneous" 
standard of review because the trial court witnessed Office Hamner's 
demeanor, questioned Officer Hamner, and was in the optimal position 
to evaluate his testimony. As the Utah Supreme Court explained in 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), 
"The authority of an appellate court, when 
reviewing the findings of a judge as well as 
those of a jury, is circumscribed by the 
deference it must give to decisions of the trier 
of the fact, who is usually in a superior 
position to appraise and weigh the evidence. The 
question for the appellate court under rule 52(a) 
is not whether it would have made the findings 
the trial court did, but whether 'on the entire 
evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed./M 
Id. at 1258 n.2, quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 
Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969) (citations omitted). 
A. THE FINDINGS ARE FACTUALLY ACCURATE. 
The State contends that the trial court's finding that 
"[t]here was no testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever represented 
himself to Officer Hamner as being named or going by the name of 
Jose Cruz, nor had he ever stopped Defendant before" was clear 
error. Brief of Appellant at 8-10. 
On the contrary; the finding was correct. Review of 
Officer Hamner/s numerous and varied answers to questions concerning 
why he thought Mr. Lopez was Jose Cruz, in sequence, demonstrates 
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the correctness of the trial court's finding. When asked numerous 
times in various ways why he thought Mr. Lopez was Jose Cruz, 
Officer Hamner responded, 
I had known him previously. 
(T. 7). 
I know of him through my narcotics experience, in 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force. 
(T. 20). 
I was [shown a picture of him through Metro 
Narcotics]. I also used to work undercover in 
the Annex bar and the Rose bar and the Old Town 
Pub and about every other bar in that area within 
a five mile radius. 
(T. 20). 
When I used to work undercover he was pointed out 
to me several times as a person who was a dealer 
out of the Annex and Rose bar. I checked on his 
name of Jose Cruz, what I was told, and I could 
not find a driver's license nor any 
identification that I could show what his real 
name was. And that's what I knew of him before. 
(T. 22-23). 
When I was working under cover he had introduced 
himself as Jose Cruz. And I believed that was 
his name. 
(T. 23). 
Defense counsel, hearing ambiguities in Officer Hamner's 
testimony, asked for clarification: 
Q He introduced himself personally to you? 
Because you had indicated that somebody pointed 
him out to you. 
A At the Annex bar when I was doing my routine 
patrol a week prior. He was pointed out. 
Q He was pointed out? 
A Yes. 
Q And they told you that's Jose Cruz? 
A Yes. Or I had known his name from previous. 
(T. 24) . 
The prosecutor responded with the following examination: 
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Q I'm not sure if the witness understood that 
question, did you? Prior to that week had you 
ever personally met the defendant? 
A Yes, I did. In the Annex bar. 
(T. 24). 
While Officer Hamner testified that he had met Mr. Lopez 
personally at some unspecified time (T. 23) and that Mr. Lopez had 
introduced himself to some unspecified person(s) as Jose Cruz at 
some unspecified time (T. 24), Officer Hamner never testified that 
Mr. Lopez introduced himself to Officer Hamner as Jose Cruz. 
B. REMAND FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS MAY BE NECESSARY. 
The State complains that the trial court's findings are not 
sufficiently thorough to facilitate meaningful appeal of the trial 
court's ruling. Brief of Appellant 7-8, relying on State v. 
Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The State has waived 
the opportunity to complain about the thoroughness of the findings. 
After defense counsel submitted the findings to the trial court, the 
State filed an objection to the findings, which objection related to 
perceived factual inaccuracies. See Appendix 3. The objection was 
filed after the State had determined to appeal the trial court's 
ruling (T. 36-37; T.2 3) and contains no allegation that the 
findings are insufficiently thorough under State v. Lovegren.7 
7. The objection states: 
[T]he State of Utah asks for a hearing on this 
matter or for the Court to write an opinion from 
which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law can 
be drafted. 
(R. 24) (emphasis added). At the hearing on the motion, the State 
did not raise the Lovegren issue or pursue further findings or a 
written opinion. See Appendix 9. 
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In the event that this Court remands this case to the trial 
court for additional findings, this Court should first affirm the 
trial court's credibility-based finding that Officer Hamner was 
acting pretextually. This Court should then direct the trial court 
to determine whether the State has met its burden to show that 
"under the facts and circumstances a reasonable officer would have 
stopped the vehicle absent an additional invalid purpose." Kehoe v, 
State. 521 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 1988). As a preliminary inquiry 
in the hypothetical reasonable officer test, this Court should 
direct the trial court to make findings concerning whether Officer 
Hamner was credible in claiming that the traffic violations 
purportedly justifying the stop of Mr. Lopez occurred at all. See 
Sierra and Arroyo, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should uphold the pretext doctrine. 
In the event that this Court remands this case for 
additional findings, this Court should first affirm the trial 
court's finding that Officer Hamner was acting pretextually and 
should then direct the trial court to determine whether the State 
met its burden of proof in seeking to justify the warrantless search 
of Mr. Lopez's car. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of June, 1991. 
ax.?**' 
Mr. Lopez 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that eight copies of 
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals and 
that four copies of the foregoing will be delivered to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this 7 day of June, 1991. 
DELIVERED by 
of June, 1991. 
this day 
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APPENDIX 1 
Motion to Suppress 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-5444 
FIL-S0 
DISTRICT COURT 
AUG f 8 3* MHO 
THIK. . S T R » f 
BY C/> ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT ~' CL£*K 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 901901111FS 
Judge DAVID S. YOUNG 
Comes now the defendant, GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ, by 
and through defense counsel JAMES A. VALDEZ, and pursuant to 
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-12 (1953), hereby moves to suppress all evidence in this 
case gathered by the Arresting Officer of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department after the investigatory stop of the Defendant 
on June 19, 1990, at the approximate location of 532 East 700 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. This Motion is based on the 
grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion based on 
objective facts to believe that the Defendant was committing or 
had committed a public offense at the time he was stopped and 
questioned by the officer(s) and that the stop was a pretext 
stop to conduct a fishing expedition type search. See Terry v. 
Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 
00019 
(1979); State of Utah v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); 
State v, Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. 
§77-7-15 (1953); Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution; Article 1, Sections 7 and 14, 
Constitution of Utah. _ L _ 
DATED this 2^\ day of July, 1990. 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this day of July, 1990. 
JUL 311990 
JOEY FWOCCHfO 
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APPENDIX 2 
Trial Court's Findings 
L a ! DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAMES A. VALDEZ (#3308) 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : FINDINGS OF FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ : Case No. 901901111FS 
JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter having come on for hearing on 
defendant's Motion to Suppress on August 1, 1990, JAMES A. VALDEZ, 
Attorney at Law, appeared on behalf of Defendant, the State of Utah 
was represented by Deputy County Attorney GREG WARNER. 
The State's witness was Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Sterling Hamner. 
At the conclusion of State's testimony, case law was 
submitted and arguments heard. 
The Court having heard testimony makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
1. Mr. Lopez was pointed out to Officer Hamner by 
someone else on a previous occasion and that he was pointed out as 
Jose Cruz, a dealer in drugs; 
AUG 2 4 1990 
Daputy Clerk 
000£7 
2. Officer Hamner relied on erroneous information and 
stopped who he thought was Jose Cruz in order to search for drugs. 
3. Based on that wrong name Officer Hamner also did a 
Driver's License check and found that there was no license issued to 
Jose Cruz; 
4. There was no testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever 
represented himself to Officer Hainner as being named or going by the 
name of Jose Cruz, nor had he ever stopped Defendant before; 
5. At about the same time Officer Hamner observed 
defendant make a left turn and says he did not see a signal at which 
time a stop was made; 
6. The underlying motivation for the stop was to search 
for drugs and all conclusions as to the identity of Mr. Lopez as 
Jose Cruz were erroneous. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The underlying motivation to follow and to stop the 
search for drugs; 
2. The stop was a "pretext stop" the subsequent search 
of the car and seizure of the contraband also violated Mr. Lopez's 
state and federal constitutional rights against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 
QQQZ8 
3. The contraband seized from the car may not be 
presented in evidence against Mr. Lopez, and his motion to suppress 
this evidence is hereby granted. 
DATED this of August, 1990. 
THE COURT: 
Approved as to form this day of August, 1990. 
GREG WARNER 
Deputy County Attorney 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this day of August, 1990. 
DELIVERED SV 
AMP 1 / 10Qf\ 
JoevFi.\co>i^ 
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APPENDIX 3 
State's Objection to Trial Court's findings 
r'r.J-jKsa 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
GREGORY M. WARNER, Bar No. 3388 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
AUG id 
'" OUfiT 
TH. yn^^H 
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 ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GERARD COTERO JOSE LOPEZ, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 90190111*S 
Honorable David S. Young 
The State of Utah, by and through its attorneys, DAVID E. 
YOCOM, Salt Lake County Attorney, and GREGORY M. WARNER, Deputy 
County Attorney, hereby objects to the proposed Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law submitted by the above-named defendant to 
the Court. 
Specifically, the State objects to paragraphs one through 
six of the Findings of Fact. That is, the defendant had previously 
introduced himself to Officer Hamner as Jose Cruz and the officer 
specifically testified that the only reason the defendant was 
pulled over was because the officer believed that •"be defeodanf rlio 
not have a valid driver's licence since the office*: ha^ previously 
determined that Mr. Cruz, the name provided to the officer: by i If-: 
defendant, did not have a valid driver's license.. 
GOO 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 8919001111 
Page two 
Additionally, after the above-named defendant's true 
identity was learned, it was determined that the defendant did not 
have a valid driver's license and that the above-named defendant 
had outstanding warrants for his arrest. 
Wherefore, the State of Utah asks for a hearing on this 
matter or for the Court to write an opinion from which Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law can be draftgd.*/i 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j£Z^Way of August, 1990. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
SaLt/\Lake County Attorney 
OQO £4 
State v. Lopez 
Case No. 891901111FS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this / / day of August, 1990, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Objection to 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to JAMES VALDEZ, 
Attorney for Defendant, at the address stated below. 
f JP««tr 
v
~ > - ~ S © G * e f t a f y ^ — \ 
JAMES VALDEZ, ESQ. 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
GMW/sc/80805 
GQ025 
APPENDIX 4 
Transcript of Hearing on State's Objection 
1
 f_B.£££££IN£i 
2 JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THIS IS THE 
5 TIME SET FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER OF STATE VERSUS 
4
 GERARD COTERO JOSE LOPEZ. THE CASE NUMBER IS 90-1901111. 
5 THIS MATTER IS SET THIS MORNING FOR PRE-TRIAL. 
6
 THE STATE IS AWARE THAT THE COURT IN A HEARING ON AUGUST 
7
 1ST GRANTED THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND I HAVE 
8 FINDINGS HERE BEFORE ME WITH THE OBJECTION OF MR. WARNER. 
9
 THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS I THOUGHT I'D LIKE MR. WARNER 
10 TO BE HERE. 
11 ARE YOU PREPARED TO DEAL WITH THE OBJECTIONS? 
U MR. STOTT: NO, I'M NOT, YOUR HONOR. HE TOLD 
13 ME THAT LAST TIME HE TALKED TO YOU YOU DIDN'T HAVE MR. 
1* VALDEZ' FINDINGS. 
IS JUDGE YOUNG: I DIDN'T BUT THEY CAME THEREAFTER. 
1<M MR. STOTT: HE HAD A COPY. AND WHAT HE ASKED 
17
 ME TO INFORM THE COURT WAS THAT HE HAD FILED, OF COURSE, 
,8
 THE OBJECTIONS AND WAS PLANNING ON APPEALING THIS CASE 
*
9
 AND COULDN'T APPEAL IT UNTIL THE ORDER, I SUPPOSE, WAS 
2 0
 DETERMINED .BY THE COURT, AND THE DATE, THAT THE TRIAL IS 
21
 THE 28TH, SO WE ARE GOING TO ASK FOR A CONTINUANCE ON THE 
2 2
 I TRIAL DATE IN ORDER TO GET THAT DONE SO HE CAN FILE THIS 
PROPER APPEAL. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. VALDEZ, YOU'VE REVIEWED THE 
OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS BY MR. WARNER. WHAT 
23 
24 
25 
3 
4 
1 IS YOUR VIEW IN RELATION TO THE OBJECTIONS? 
2 I MR. VALDEZ: WELL, I THINK WHAT HE SPECIFICALLY 
OBJECTS TO IS THAT HE'S CLAIMING, THAT HE'S CLAIMING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT HAD INTRODUCED HIMSELF TO HAMNER AS JOSE 
5 I CRUZ. I DON'T THINK THAT WAS THE TESTIMONY. I DON'T 
6
 I REMEMBER HEARING THAT AT ALL. IT'S BEEN A WHILE BUT THAT'S 
7
 I WHY I FILED MY FINDINGS OF FACT IN THE MANNER THAT I DID. 
8 AND I THINK THAT WAS CLEARLY NOT EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED 
* JUDGE YOUNG: MY RECOLLECTION OF THE TESTIMONY 
10 WAS THAT OFFICER HAMNER HAD THE--THAT MR. LOPEZ HAD BEEN 
11 IDENTIFIED TO OFFICER HAMNER AS JOSE CRUZ. I WOULD ASSUME 
12 THAT THAT IDENTITY WAS NOT BY MR. LOPEZ HIMSELF BUT BY 
13 A THIRD PARTY, AND THAT WAS MY RECOLLECTION OF IT AS WELL. 
M I DIDN'T KNOW THAT THEY WERE IN THE SAME CIRCLE BEING INTRO-
15 DUCED. BUT OFFICER HAMNER TESTIFIED, IN MY RECOLLECTION, 
'« THAT WHEN HE SAW MR. LOPEZ DRIVING THE CAR HE THOUGHT AT 
17 THAT TIME THAT IT WAS MR. JOSE CRUZ, AN INDIVIDUAL WHO 
18
 HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED TO HIM AS ONE INVOLVED IN THE DRUG 
19 I TRADE BEFORE. 
MR. VALDEZ: THAT'S CORRECT. 
21 I JUDGE YOUNG: AND THAT HE DID A CHECK ON JOSE 
22
 CRUZ AND HE FOUND JOSE CRUZ DID NOT HAVE A DRIVER'S LICENSE, 
23
 THEREFORE, HE WENT AFTER MR.--HE BEGAN TO FOLLOW MR. LOPEZ 
2 4
 I THINKING HE WAS JOSE CRUZ WITHOUT A DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
MR. LOPEZ THEN MADE A MINOR INFRACTION ON A TURN, HE PULLED, 
20 
25 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE OFFICER PULLED HIM OVER AND THE COURT FOUND THAT SINCE 
THE INITIAL BEGINNING INFORMATION WAS ERRONEOUS, THAT HE 
HAD THE WRONG NAME, THAT IT WAS A PRETEXT STOP AND, THUS, 
SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS RECEIVED THEREAFTER. 
MR. VALDEZ: THAT'S CORRECT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO I WILL SIGN THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT THAT YOU PRESENTED TO THE COURT, AND IF YOU WOULD 
ADVISE MR. WARNER THEN THE DATE FOR THE RUNNING OF THE 
APPEAL CAN BEGIN. 
MR. STOTT: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. STOTT: FINE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: NOW, BASED UPON THE COURT'S SIGNING 
THE ORDER--AND I'M JUST DRAWING A LINE THROUGH MR. WARNER'S 
SIGNATURE LINE ANTICIPATING THAT HE WOULD NOT APPROVE THIS 
ORDER AS TO FORM HAVING FILED HIS OBJECTIONS--BUT BASED 
UPON THE SIGNING OF THE ORDER WHAT IS THE POSITION OF THE 
STATE IN RELATION TO PROCEEDING WITH THE TRIAL? 
MR. STOTT: YOUR HONOR, I UNDERSTAND THAT MR. 
WARNER WOULD LIKE TO APPEAL THIS MATTER AND, OBVIOUSLY, 
IN ORDER TO DO THAT WE'D ASK FOR A STAY OR CONTINUANCE 
OF THE TRIAL. IF THE TRIAL GOES AHEAD, OBVIOUSLY, IT WILL 
BE APPEALED BY US SO IT WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT, THE APPEAL 
BY US WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. VALDEZ, I'LL RETURN TO YOU 
^_ 5 1 
1 A COURTESY COPY OF YOUR FINDINGS. 
2 MR. VALDEZ: THANK YOU. 
3 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU DIDN'T PROVIDE ME WITH AN 
4 EXTRA COPY OF THE ORDER. I SIGNED AN ORDER GRANTING IT. 
5 YOU CAN CONFORM YOUR COPY TO TODAY'S DATE. 
* MR. VALDEZ: I WILL. THANK YOU. 
7
 JUDGE YOUNG: WHAT IS YOUR POSITION IN RELATION 
8 TO THE STATUS OF THE CASE PENDING THE APPEAL? 
9 MR. VALDEZ: WELL, IT'S BEEN OUR POSITION--
10 I COULD MOVE TO CONTINUE, BUT--I CAN MOVE TO DISMISS, BUT 
11 IF THE COURT DISMISSED IT THEY'D HAVE AN AUTOMATIC APPEAL. 
12 I THINK THEY OUGHT TO BE REQUIRED TO REQUEST PERMISSION 
13 TO APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE COURT AND IF GRANTED THEN 
H ALLOWED THE APPEAL. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOUR POSITION IS YOU WOULD 
1* JOIN IN THE STATE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL? 
17
 MR. VALDEZ: WELL, I HATE TO DO THAT 'CAUSE 
,8
 I HATE TO HAVE ANYTHING PENDING CONCERNING MR. LOPEZ. 
1* I THINK THAT I WOULD JOIN IN THAT MOTION FOR THE PURPOSE 
20
 OF THEIR REQUESTING THE ABILITY TO APPEAL FROM THE APPELLATE 
21 COURT FOR MAYBE 30 DAYS AND, IF, AT THAT POINT IN TIME, 
2 2
 IF NOTHING IS DONE, I'LL PROBABLY FILE A MOTION TO DISMISS. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: WILL THEY HAVE--ALL RIGHT. THEY 
2 4
 HAVE THE RIGHT TO FILE THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL AT ANY TIME 
2 5
 WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THIS DATE SO TO EXPECT A REPLY FROM THE 
1 APPELLATE COURT I THINK LIKELY WOULD NOT OCCUR WITHIN THAT 
2 PERIOD OF TIME. 
3 THE MOTION TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL DATE, THE TRIAL 
4 NOW SCHEDULED FOR AUGUST 28TH, IS GRANTED. THE MOTION OF 
5 THE STATE. A NEW TRIAL DATE WILL NOT BE SET AT THIS TIME. 
6 I WILL ASK YOU TO MONITOR THE CASE YOURSELVES AND TO ADVISE 
^ THE COURT WITHIN 60 DAYS WHETHER THE MATTER SHOULD BE DEALT 
8 WITH ON A MOTION TO DISMISS OR WHETHER THE MATTER IS BEING 
9 RESOLVED BY APPEAL. 
10 MR. VALDEZ: THANK YOU. 
11 JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT WILL NOT 
12 NOTE ANY FURTHER TIME FOR ACTION OTHER THAN WAITING FOR 
13 COUNSEL TO PROVIDE IT. 
14 MR. VALDEZ: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
15 CWHEREUPON, THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE WAS 
!« I CONCLUDED). 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
APPENDIX 5 
Officer Hamner's Police Report 
\L_1™*_:L 
"KiHTc" ! PRIMARY OFFENSF 
353? ! POSSESS COCAINh 
ADDRESS OF OCCURRENCE 
532 F 
* OCCURRED - IF KNOWN 
DATF TIMF DAY 
06/19/90 21:00 TUE 
FFl.ONY? 
YES 
/•""VIITTAI REPORT - I R 1 
NCJC 
fi 11 :•• 
SECONDARY OTf-FNSF ! U.-.T!-' ! C.VtF r f i . 
' RLP01:7 ED ' 
IM P 011N .l.i i 0 -•• ••• i ? /''? 0 ! ".'"-••• A 0 11 r •--
! EVIDENCE RFPORT? 
! YES 
700 S 
IF UNKNOWN - SECURED 
DATE TIMF RAY 
/ / J 00 ! / 
! TYPE OF PRFMISE 
! STREET 
APT 
! DISCOVERED 
! OATF T/.MF 
/ :oo 
DAY 
COMPLAINANT FIELD - CF CAST ?o-C'60C<85 
COMPLAINANT IS ALSO 
VICTIM? WITNESS? 
I NAME (IAST» FIRST) 
HAMNER/SLCPD 
PFRSON I AST SECURING PREMISE? 
AnriRFSS 
RES PHONE !Nl) ! BUS PHONE 
IPHONF! 
i i 
CITY ST 
SEX ! RACE !A'1E ! 0 , Q • t. 
! ' ! 
! I I 
APT 7 IF 
! CAN iyiTNG3: 
i J TV? ! ! M!":!)? • 
i i ! 
ARRESTED PERSON FIELD tiF r. A sE 
ADULT? YES JUVENILE? 
NAME 
LOPEZ, GERARDO JOSE 
AKA 
CRUZ, JOSE LOPEZ 
Pt.ACF OF B.TRTH 
MEXICO 
S.S. NO ! DR. I.JO 
528912481 ! 
ADRS 6.1 5F 700 S 
CITY ST 
CANCEL WANT 
D.O.R. ! TYPE ! ARREST NO ! SO NO, ! HF MO, 
09/24/60 ! D ! 000091.91. ! 1657 10 ! 256125 
PCI NUMBER ! CDR NO, ! SEX ! RftCF ! A'vF 
! 53944A ! M ! HEX ! 29 
HEIGHT ! WEIGHT ! HAIR ! FYFS 
5 FT 6 IN ! 180 ! BLACK ! BROUN 
SCARS* TATOOS, COMF1FXTON 
SCAR LT EYE, I.F EYE PIERCED 
2 ! 7.TP ! PKS FIIONI- ! NO PI1DHF 
i ! ! 
CHARGES 
POSS C.S.W.I*, POSS STOLEN PROP, W/A NON MOVING VTO (2CNTS) 
COURT APPEARANCF ! MTPD. CITATION 
DATE / / TIME 00 J 00 ! 
DETAILS FIELD DF CASE 
AND FOUND THE 
BY THIY NAME, . 
I OBSERVED THE A/P DRIVING SOUTH OF 400 E TURNING EAST ON 7 
SIGNAL...! HAD PREVIOUS! Y OBSERVED THE VH.H PARKED IN FRONT VF 
AND THE ANNEX BAR? WHICH ARE KNOWN TO HE TO BE FREQUENTED BY 
AND DEALERS. 
I HAD DID A REGISTRATION CHECK ON THE PLATE 
NOT THE OWNER. I ALSO KNFW THE DRIVER WHO GOES 
DIDN'T HAVE A DRIVER LICENSE. 
AFTER THE A/P MADF AN JMPROPFR TURN, I PLU I FD HIM OVF.K AT 
I DETERMINED HE STILL DIDN'T HAVE A D.L. AND HE HAD THREE WAR 
900005358, 900008932, R9003397R, AIL OUT 01' SIC OUROUIT COURT 
THE A/P FOR THE WARRANTS AND NO D.L. AND MAKING AN IMPROPER i 
I BEGAN AN INVENTORY SEARCH PRIOR TO IHPOUND AND fUKfOVFRF 
COCAINE HIDDEN BETWEEN THE BACK AND BOTTOM CUSHIONS OF THE OR 
OFC GARDINER LOOKFD AND FOUND MORF BAGS. 
IN THE TRUNK, I FOUND ONE KENWOOD STEREO STOLEN FROM CASE 
WALLET CONTAINING D.I.., ROBINSON CREDIT CARD STOI EN FROM S9/6 
VIDEO CASSETTE TAPE STOLEN FROM CASE 90/39342 IN A BURGLARY i 
BROWNS SUPP. 
OFC EVANS MIRANDA THE A/P AND THE A/P TOLD ncc EVANS THE C 
HIS. SEE SUPP. THE VFH WAS IMPOUNDED HOLD FOR METRO. 
0 S U 
THE R 
DRUG 
npTyF 
03F i': 
532 F 
RANT Si 
/OUT 
USE BAR 
USERS 
R UA'J 
RI * 7 -
? ("> o s .. 
£L'RESTFD 
URN . 
0 ONE 
.TVER 
8 ? / 1 4 
9 •?<;•> A 
=?EE '::' 
F'r.i-; 01 
SE.P.T. 
4 3 / * ONE 
N.!' ONL 
G7 g 
OCAINE WftS 
OFFICER INFORMATION FIF.I J1 - OF CASE 9 0 - 0 6 0 0 S 5 
ASSISTING OFFICERS ID N U . / D I V . ID N O . / D I V 
GB5P 
RFPORT STATUS 
CASE CLOSED? 
YES 
RECEIVED IN RECORDS 
DATF TIME 
06/20/90 00:16 
! RFPORTING OFFICFR 
HAMNER, STERLIN 
CLEARANCE: 
EXCEPT? UNF? ARREST? 
YFS 
AGE GROUPt 
ADULT? JUVENILE' 
YFS 
COMPUTER ENTRY ID 
74FR 
.CPD. S;">LEHENTARY REPORT - SR CASE 9 0-0 6 00 ':.:•'"> 
NCTC PRIMARY OFFENSE 
5405 
CLASSCTN 
I CHANGE? 
NO 
MOVING TRAF VIOLTN 
! FFI PNY? 
j 
! YFS 
ADDRESS OF OCCURRENCE 
538 F 
NCIC ! SECONDARY OFFENSE ! HATC ' CASE NO. 
! ! RFPOftl'FD ! 
! ! 06/19/90 ! 90-060OS 
OCCURRED 
DATE TIME DAY 
06/18/90 OOtOO TUF 
700 S AFT 
DETAILS F.TFI D - DF CASF 90 0.0008ft 
I WATCHED OFFICFR HAMNFR OPFN A PYM PAG IN THF TRUNK OF THE 
VEHICLE DURING HIS IMPOUND INVENTORY, THE BAG CONTAINED SEVER 
ONE OF WHICH WAS "THE DFAD POETS SOCIETY" FROM TOP HAT VXDFPr 
T. CONTACTED BRYCE JULLEY THERE AND HE VFRTFIED THAT A €USTOME 
STEVFNS* REPORTFD THIS TAPE STOI FN IN A HPUSF BURPLARY r 9(-^?.5<1?. 
VERIFIED THIS CASE AND HAD OFFICER BRING THE A/P TO THE PSB SIXTH 
SPEAK WITH DFT. R. HOWELL. 
THPOl 
AL Vi 
9 0 0 
R» 
N.MFD 
R TAPES? 
S ''-'.1 F. 
:OTT 
.r 
FLOOR TO 
OFFICFR INFORMATION FIFI.D - PF CASE 90-060085 
ASSISTING PFFTCFRS ID NO « /Jl! V • I ID NO./DIV 
D52P 
REPORT STATUS 
CASE CLOSED? 
YES 
RECEIVED IN RECORDS 
\ DATE TIME 
! 04/19/90 22:36 
! RFPORTING OFFICFR 
BROUN» WILLIAM 
CLEARANCFJ 
EXCEPT? UNF? ARREST? 
AGF GRPUPt 
ADULT? JUVENILE? 
COMPUTER ENTRY ID 
62ER 
